| Rick V. Iqbal | Case No. SC/CV–07 | | --- | --- |
Majority Opinion delivered by Justice Tark;
The complainant argues that Article 36 of the Constitution, regarding judicial independence, is what prohibits a state judge from serving in an executive or administrative position while holding office as a state judge. But we must first examine what the Constitution itself provides for regarding the incompatibility of office.
“No member of Congress may concurrently serve as President. No member of Congress may concurrently serve as Justice on the Supreme Court.”
When the Constitution intends to prohibit conduct, in this case concurrent officeholding, it does so expressly. The Constitution has no equivalent clause that prohibits a state judge from serving within the federal executive branch or within an administrative judicial office.
Instead, the complainant relies upon Article 36, which states that judges “shall be independent in the performance of their judicial powers.” Independent performance is not the same as a constitutional prohibition on concurrent officeholding. This Court would be required to expand the Constitutional text beyond its plain wording and establish a new constitutional incompatibility doctrine where one is absent in text.
Individual controversies may raise potential conflicts of interests, yes, but in such circumstances the principles of recusal and the oath that judicial officers take remains operative. Article 35 requires a judge to “sit impartially” and to uphold the Constitution. It does not render any sort of prohibition against concurrent officeholding except where explicitly stated.
Therefore, the Court finds that there is no constitutional prohibition against the simultaneous holding of a state judicial office and executive or administrative office absent explicit constitutional or statutory restriction.
The complainant further argues that the fact that the Respondent had a suspended bar certification thus rendered his exercise of judicial authority unconstitutional.
Yet, there is nowhere in the Constitution that establishes active bar certification as a constitutional prerequisite to judicial office. In fact, the Constitution mentions the word “bar” a total of zero times. The Constitution specifies means of appointment, tenure, and oath requirements for judges, but lacks any sort of provision regarding continued certification by the Department of Justice.
Let us then look at Article 12:
“The powers not delegated to Krameria by these articles, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”
There is no constitutional provision that places the Department of Justice with the authority to conclusively determine judicial eligibility through licensing requirements and mechanisms. To hold otherwise would then permit an executive department, operated by political means, to indirectly control judicial qualification without explicit constitutional permission.
White bar certification may be considered politically or professionally relevant, this Court cannot elevate such certification into a requirement where none exists in the Constitution itself.
Therefore, the Court finds that suspended bar certification alone does not invalidate the lawful exercise of political power under the Constitution of the Republic of Krameria.
The Court recognizes that Article 38 grants the Supreme Court authority to uphold the provisions of this Constitution and to strike laws and actions that act contrary to it. However, judicial review does not authorize the Court to create constitutional provisions unsupported by the text.
The complainant has failed to demonstrate that the Respondent’s conduct was in violation of any express constitutional limitation. The respondent’s submission was correct in observing the fact that the Constitution explicitly specifies incompatibilities where intended, and otherwise leaves undelegated powers to the states, or to the people.