Opinion delivered by Sempronius Hersey, Associate Justice;
I concur with the reasoning of the majority.
On this matter, I dissent from the reasoning of the majority. Let us examine the relevant text:
“No law shall provide certain rights, privileges, immunities, or protections to any particular person or persons; provided, that those same rights, privileges, immunities, or protections are not provided to all persons.”
Let us define some terms first, using Wiktionary. The term privilege is defined as “A particular benefit, advantage, or favor; a right or immunity enjoyed by some but not others; a prerogative, preferential treatment.”. Provide is defined as “To make possible or attainable.”.
While it may be questionable, the ultimate conclusion seems to point to that, there is no formal inequality, only practical inequality, but under my judicial philosophy, when the language is unambiguous, I must defer entirely to the formal text, rather than practical realities. And the language of this provision seems to support that it intends for formal inequality, as through logic, even the poorest person could theoretically attain sufficient funds, and the act in question does not seem to exclude in any manner other than monetary, which is theoretically able to be gained by anyone.
I concur with the reasoning of the majority.
I concur with the judgment on the first matter.
I dissent with the reasoning of the majority on the amicus curiae brief, if fees may not restrict association, then they may not do so in any capacity. The Constitution is clear in its conditions, and as the majority wrote, fees are not necessities. Would it not abridge such freedom, if one were restricted from associating by inability to pay fees?
I concur with the judgment on the second matter.
I concur with the judgment on the third matter.